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Reconsidering institutional cosmopolitanism: global poverty and the
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Steven Slaughter
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Cosmopolitan scholarship has been at the forefront of efforts to consider political structures
capable of realising justice in a more robust manner than prevailing global governance
arrangements. In particular, the arguments of Thomas Pogge have contributed significantly
to scholarly thinking about global poverty and his scheme of ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’
aspires to institutionalise human rights in the structures of global governance. This essay cri-
tiques the capacity of Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach to productively guide political action in
relation to global poverty by questioning whether global institutions generated by human
rights are sufficient to address global poverty. The argument in this essay is that a viable
guide to political action which alleviates global poverty must also take account of the potential
utility of the state. This essays draws upon republican ideas to contend that cosmopolitanism
needs to encompass a robust account of local institutions such as the state.
Keywords: international political theory; global governance; global poverty; cosmopolitan-
ism; Republicanism
Within the field of International Political Theory (IPT) there has been a growing concern for the
forms of political representation and governance necessary to achieve global justice. While the
field of IPT considers the nature and defensibility of ethical principles regarding issues such as
war, human rights and distributive justice,1 the field now overtly considers rival accounts of
prospective global governance in addressing specific international ethical issues. The literature
addressing the issue of global poverty has typified this renewed focus on governing structures
and policies. While IPT comprises a diverse range of political positions, cosmopolitan scholar-
ship has been at the forefront of efforts to consider political structures capable of realising justice
in a more robust manner than prevailing global governance arrangements. In particular, the
arguments of Thomas Pogge have contributed significantly to scholarly thinking about global
poverty. A central foundation of cosmopolitan contributions has been the argument that
addressing extreme poverty is not charity or beneficence on the part of wealthy societies and
individuals, but a moral obligation of the wealthy which stems from the human rights of the
global poor. This obligation is not being met given the prevailing severity of extreme global
poverty. Cosmopolitans contend that global arrangements ought to promote a standard of univer-
sal justice which provides the fundamental human rights of all people. This necessitates
rearranging the structures and policies of global governance. Specifically, Pogge’s scheme of
‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ aspires to fulfil this obligation by institutionalising human
rights in the international and transnational structures of global governance.2
Email: slaughts@deakin.edu.au
1 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1992), 3.
2 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), 169.
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This essay critiques the capacity of Pogge’s cosmopolitan position to productively guide
political action in theory and practice in relation to global poverty by questioning whether
global institutions generated by human rights are sufficient to address global poverty. While
reforming global institutions with a thorough commitment to human rights and identifying
global moral responsibilities is necessary to a prospective global order that avoids the global
deprivations currently being visited upon the world’s most vulnerable people, the question is
whether global institutions and moral responsibilities alone are sufficient. The argument in
this essay is that a viable guide to political action which alleviates global poverty must also
take account of the potential utility of local institutions such as the state and advance proposals
which allow less developed states to have capacity for local action to address poverty.
Consequently, scholarly attention within IPT should also consider feasible local institutional
designs which can support efforts to promote poverty alleviation – not just on global
institutional forms which relate to global moral responsibilities that address extreme poverty.
This essays draws upon republican ideas to emphasise the importance of local institutions and
to contend that cosmopolitanism needs to encompass a robust account of local institutions
such as the state.
The argument that cosmopolitan proposals need a stronger account of local institutions to
address extreme global poverty proceeds in three steps. First, the essay considers the foremost
cosmopolitan argument with respect to global poverty in the form of Thomas Pogge’s analysis of
the moral responsibilities which result from existing patterns of global poverty and the cosmo-
politan institutions which could ameliorate this circumstance. Second, the essay identifies some
problematic aspects of this cosmopolitan approach. Specifically, that cosmopolitanism struggles
to grapple with the significance of local political dynamics and the prospect that the appeal to
human rights is not politically compelling enough to create strong global moral responsibilities
and institutions. The last section considers some of the implications of focusing upon local
political agency and the promotion of robust state institutions by utilising republican political
theory. The republican claim is made that IPT examinations of prospective forms of global
governance need to more fully consider the productive role of the state, especially when it
comes to cosmopolitan political programmes which attempt to alleviate global poverty.
Thomas Pogge, human rights and global poverty
Cosmopolitanism has become a prominent line of reasoning within IPT. Cosmopolitanism
possesses a resolute ethical commitment to the universal community of humanity and a sense
of detachment from solely local or national affiliations. However, contemporary cosmopolitan
arguments are diverse, with a range of motivations underpinning the notion of a universal
community of humanity.3 Furthermore, there are a range of differing articulations of the political
and institutional forms which are required to support a universal concern for humanity. The most
modest form of cosmopolitanism is ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ which advances universal prin-
ciples of human concern which act as standards by which existing political arrangements and
institutions should be justified and criticised.4 An example of this form of cosmopolitanism is
evident in robust articulations of human rights. The most elaborate articulation of cosmopolitan-
ism is referred to as ‘political cosmopolitanism’ which advocates the creation of universal
political institutions at a global level which include all people of the world in the articulation
of democratic global institutions. While there are many examples of contemporary political
3 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, in For Love of Country, ed. Martha Nussbaum (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1996), 7; Nicholas Rengger, ‘Political Theory and International Relations: Promised Land or Exit
from Eden’, International Affairs 76, no. 4 (October 2000): 763.
4 Charles Beitz, ‘International Liberalism and Distributive Justice’, World Politics 51 (January 1999): 287. For a
similar conception see Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, 7–8.
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cosmopolitan thought, the strongest accounts of political cosmopolitanism are those of Daniele
Archibugi, Richard Falk, Anthony McGrew and David Held.
In between these articulations of cosmopolitanism is a position usefully termed ‘institutional
cosmopolitanism’ by Thomas Pogge. This position aspires to realise human rights through the
restructuring of existing international arrangements and the development of new institutions
which formally recognise human rights as having fundamental priority over other social and econ-
omic objectives, as well as possessing the capacity to distribute resources to fulfil the fundamental
human rights of individuals around the world. Rather than being a mere standard to gauge the
affairs and practices of nation-states, institutional cosmopolitanism (IC) entails the development
of a range of practical institutions which transcend nation-states in order to arrange an institutional
context which fulfils the indispensable needs of all human beings. In order to appreciate the
position of IC it is necessary to detail Pogge’s understanding of the political structures which
permit the existing patterns of global poverty and the form of moral responsibilities which
stem from the continuing preservation of these unjust institutional arrangements.
Pogge and cosmopolitans call attention to the massive suffering stemming from global
poverty. While there have been some important improvements in the aggregate condition of
the world’s poor, ‘One in five people in the world – more than 1 billion people – still
survive on less than $1 a day’ and another ‘1.5 billion people live on $1–$2 a day’.5 It is
hard to overstate the horror of contemporary global poverty given that these income levels
produce numerous poverty-related deaths around the developing world. Pogge indicates that
poverty-related disasters are not unprecedented; there were 30 million poverty-related deaths
resulting from the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in China from 1959 to 1962, as well as other
famines.6 However,
In just 16 years since the end of the Cold War, some 300 million human beings have died prema-
turely from poverty-related causes, with some 18 million more added each year. Much larger
numbers of human beings must live in conditions of life-threatening poverty that make it very diffi-
cult for them to articulate their interests and effectively to fend for themselves and their families.7
The disquieting fact is that this extraordinary level of avoidable deprivation prevails in the
midst of a world that is increasingly prosperous. Furthermore, various international human
rights agreements have repeatedly stated that severe economic deprivation is morally unaccep-
table. International efforts to highlight and address the issue of extreme poverty are evident in
the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Socio-economic human rights
were articulated and fully developed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, The Declaration on the Right to Development and The Convention of the
Rights of the Child. These principles are regarded as being an indivisible part of the
broader human rights agenda, as well as part of the UN’s agenda of promoting human
rights to entrench international peace and security. Articulations of socio-economic human
rights can be seen as indications of an international normative consensus which sees human
dignity as being incompatible with starvation and deprivation. The essential point about this
international consensus against extreme poverty and the right to subsist is that while ‘the
right itself has obtained a broad based cross-cultural consensus across the society of states
. . . controversy remains around the different economic, social and political questions involved
in its implementation, but the right itself is not contested’.8 This international concern coa-
5 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), 24.
6 Thomas Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor’, Leiden
Journal of International Law 18, no. 4 (2005): 741.
7 Ibid., 740.
8 Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez and Barry Buzan, ‘A Viable Project of Solidarism? The Neglected Contributions of John
Vincent’s Basic Rights Initiative’, International Relations 17 (2003): 328.
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lesced into the signing of the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the resulting
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which articulated a multifaceted response to extreme
global poverty.
Pogge is quick to indicate that ‘socioeconomic human rights, such as that “to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing,
housing, and medical care” (UDHR, Art. 25) are currently, and by far, the most frequently
violated human rights’.9 The reasons for this are varied. While the implementation of socio-
economic human rights was frustrated by a lack of political support during the Cold War, the
development of socio-economic human rights international law during and after the Cold War
indicates that many governments in the developing world valued and supported UN efforts to
address extreme poverty. Furthermore, the implementation of socio-economic human rights
clashes with other components of global governance and other ideological forces in world
politics. The impact of the legal and policy elements associated with global capitalism are
asserted as one of the key frustrations of subsistence human rights because socio-economic
human rights agreements are largely soft-law rhetorical agreements and declarations whereas
global capitalism is ‘embodied in much harder legal and organizational forms’.10 As Pogge
asserts, the human rights of the world’s poor are ‘recognized and violated by international law’.11
While the development of the MDGs may or may not be an important step forward in efforts
to effectively address global poverty, Cosmopolitan scholars such as Pogge have clearly articu-
lated that existing measures aimed at addressing poverty have failed to uphold basic human
rights relating to subsistence. More pointedly, Pogge suggests that the prevailing institutional
order has permitted gross abuses of human rights: ‘affluent countries, partly through the
global institutional order they impose, bear a great causal and moral responsibility for the
massive global persistence of severe poverty’.12 Cosmopolitans contend that human rights
require maximal efforts to protect individuals from the consequences of extreme deprivation
wherever they live. That is, universal human rights entail the promotion of moral responsibilities
which extend beyond any one national political community and the formulation of global insti-
tutions which give effect to these rights. The goal of these thinkers is to get human rights to chal-
lenge rather than parallel the existence of extreme global poverty. This entails the development
of a global institutional context where extreme poverty is addressed by cosmopolitan ideas and
institutions which entrench individual human rights in a more substantial way.
Pogge’s argument focuses on the role that the prevailing institutional order plays in creating
and sustaining global poverty, and consequently the responsibility that wealthy governments and
societies bear in not promoting an institutional order which adequately fulfils subsistence human
rights. As Pogge forcefully asserts:
We are familiar, through charity appeals, with the assertion that it lies in our hands to save the lives
of many or, by doing nothing, to let these people die. We are less familiar with the assertion exam-
ined here of a weightier responsibility: that most of us do not merely let people starve but also
participate in starving them.13
Pogge claims that ‘we are harming the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing
an unjust global institutional order upon them’ which ‘foreseeably perpetuates large-scale
human rights deficits that would be reasonably avoidable through feasible institutional modifi-
cations’.14 His use of the term ‘we’ refers to those who benefit from the prevailing institutional
9 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’, 718.
10 Gonzalez-Pelaez and Buzan, ‘A Viable Project of Solidarism?’, 332.
11 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’.
12 Thomas Pogge, ‘The First UN Millennium Development Goal: A Cause for Celebration?’, Journal of Human Devel-
opment 5, no. 3 (2004): 392.
13 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 214.
14 Thomas Pogge, ‘World Poverty and Human Rights,’ Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 5.
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order – principally those in wealthy Western states. His focus on the moral responsibility of
people in wealthy states is born out of duties stemming from human rights, specifically that
there is not necessarily a positive responsibility to help those in need but there is definitely a
negative responsibility derived from human rights not to benefit from or participate in
harming the global poor. For Pogge negative duties stem from the moral need to ensure ‘that
others are not unduly harmed (or wronged) through one’s conduct’, while positive duties are
where we have ‘a duty to benefit persons or to shield them from other harms’.15 While scholars
like Peter Singer have argued that addressing global poverty is a positive duty of the wealthy to
the global poor,16 for Pogge the responsibly of the wealthy to assist the global poor stems from
the duty not to participate in a global order which is harming them.
Pogge’s focus on the negative duty to not contribute to harming the global poor leads to a
clear directive: because the prevailing global institutional order does not adequately fulfil
fundamental socio-economic human rights, this institutional order must be urgently transformed.
Moral responsibility stems from the duties of human right claims, specifically to avoid harming
other human beings. Consequently, responsibility to change this institutional scheme rests with
those not upholding this fundamental duty – the same individuals and governments currently
benefiting from the institutional order which produces and reproduces patterns of extreme
poverty. Socio-economic human rights are central to productively transforming prevailing
international law and international organisations, as well as being the motivation for new
institutional forms which actively promote the individual rights of the global poor. This directive
is vulnerable to the charge that the prevailing global order does not unequivocally perpetuate
extreme poverty. This will be examined further in the next section. However, Pogge’s argument
is also dependent on the prospect of an alternative global institutional order which diminishes the
harm to the global poor. The feasibility of Pogge’s proposals to address global poverty is crucial
to the claim that the current system is indefensible.
Pogge’s alternative global order of IC involves a restructuring of existing international
structures and the development of some new international and transnational frameworks
which promote the interests of the global poor in a significant and sustained manner. In terms
of reforming existing international institutions, Pogge argues that to achieve a ‘global order
less burdensome on the global poor’ it is necessary that affluent countries move beyond
prevailing conceptions of development and make
the international trade, lending, investment, and intellectual-property regimes fairer to the global
poor as well as some costs of compensating for harms done – for example by helping to fund
basic health facilities, vaccination programmes, basic schooling, school lunches, safe water and
sewage systems, basic housing, power plants and networks, banks and microlending, and road,
rail, and communication links where these do not yet exist.17
Specifically, Pogge proposes that the World Trade Organization (WTO) should cease permitting
Western protectionism that disadvantages the developing world. Obviously Pogge is not alone in
this claim. A 2002 Oxfam report claims that if developing countries were able to increase their
market share of world trade by 1% it would lift 128 million of the world’s poorest people out of
poverty.18 Furthermore, Pogge also criticises the way Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) in the WTO which relate to pharmaceutical patents neglect the interests of the unwell in
15 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 130.
16 Peter Singer, ‘The Singer Solution to World Poverty’, New York Times, 5 September 1999.
17 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’, 744.
18 Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation and the Fight against Poverty (Oxfam Inter-
national, 2002), 5, http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/report_english.pdf (accessed 2 January 2006).
The impact of trade liberalisation on poverty is heavily contested. See, for example, Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker
and David Rosnick, Scorecard on Development: 25 Years of Diminished Progress, DESA Working Paper No. 31
(2006), http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp31_2006.pdf (accessed 9 October 2008).
Global Change, Peace & Security 41
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 2
3:
22
 1
4 
De
ce
mb
er
 2
00
9
the developing world. He suggests redesigning these institutional arrangements so that pharma-
ceutical patents are rewarded according to the extent they alleviate the burdens of disease and
illness around the world.19
IC is also attentive to the ways the global order bestows important rights upon the rulers of
states which are important to the development of dysfunctional states and play a key role in con-
stituting global patterns of poverty. Pogge points out that while membership of international
organisations (such as the WTO) is formally voluntary, it is only the rulers who have an
active choice in the matter, not the public of many states.20 The global order favours the
leaders of states, and the population is bound by international agreements, regardless of the
level of public engagement. He also claims that ‘international resource, borrowing, treaty,
and arms privileges we extend to such rulers are quite advantageous to them, providing them
with the money and arms they need to stay in power’.21 This is especially the case with the
way these privileges allow governments ‘to dispose of the country’s natural resources (inter-
national resource privilege) and freely to borrow in the country’s name (international borrowing
privilege)’.22 These privileges often do not lead to tangible benefits to the poor within these
societies. Pogge’s response to the ways these privileges in the global order systematically dis-
advantage and entrench the global poor is to develop an international institutional context
which sharply restricts these privileges. Specifically, IC would entail a ‘global resource divi-
dend’ in which a proportion of all traded natural resources would be directed at ensuring that
the global poor would be able to fulfil their basic needs, wherever they may reside.23 Pogge
also proposes, in relation to the problems of autocratic regimes abusing their international bor-
rowing privileges, that there should be a constitutional amendment in all states that loans bor-
rowed by authoritarian rulers are not binding for subsequently constitutional democratic
regimes. Such a proposal would deter banks from lending to authoritarian states. Pogge
claims this would deter coup d’e´tats and prevent autocratic regimes derailing development tra-
jectories by imposing large debt burdens on subsequent legitimate governments.24
Pogge’s articulation of IC has illuminated the graphic scale of contemporary global poverty,
critically scrutinised attitudes and interests which permit global poverty to persist, and, most
importantly, proposed a range of alternative political structures which address the human
rights and economic needs of those currently neglected. His analysis sees local institutions as
very much being constructed by a global institutional order created and sustained by the affluent
countries operating in conjunction with local elites. The important consequence of Pogge’s
proposal of IC is that programmes such as the global resource dividend and restrictions on inter-
national borrowing privileges would condition the ways state sovereignty would be exercised
and create institutions that would cut across state boundaries. Yet, importantly, these institutions
would not seek to create – or necessitate – a world government or global democracy as
articulated by other cosmopolitans.
Critiquing institutional cosmopolitanism
The proposal of IC exists in between the moral and political conceptions of cosmopolitanism.
Nonetheless, IC is a dramatic reworking of the prevailing structures of global governance. The
new institutions proposed by Pogge and the reforming of existing international institutions to
19 Thomas Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program’, Metaphilosophy 36, no. 1–2 (2005):
182–209.
20 Pogge, ‘The First UN Millennium Development Goal’, 392.
21 Pogge, ‘World Poverty and Human Rights’, 7.
22 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’, 737.
23 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 196–7.
24 Ibid., 153–5.
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ensure that the needs of poor individuals around the world would be prioritised would be a sub-
stantial shift away from the prevailing approaches to combating global poverty. The arrangement
of IC would be animated by a direct line of moral responsibility from wealthy – largely Western
– societies to the global poor. However, while these proposals would work within the prevailing
system of states, questions certainly remain whether this approach is feasible and realistic in pol-
itical terms. It certainly appears, given the power of Western states, the hegemonic position of
neo-liberal capitalism in policy-making circles and the narrow domestic concerns of many
Western governments, that Pogge’s proposals appear politically unrealistic. However, the viabi-
lity of cosmopolitan proposals, and the viability of realising global justice in general, is not deter-
mined only by the likelihood of realising these proposals but rather whether they act as a
defensible ethical guide to political action. Viability rests both on questions of political feasibility
and ethical defensibility in theory and practice. Given the specific moral responsibilities ident-
ified by Pogge and the detailed nature of the institutional reforms, IC is a significantly more com-
pelling programme of action than other accounts which do not offer the same level of detail and
specificity. Nevertheless, there are two important issues surrounding the proposal of IC which
significantly condition its utility as a guide to action in theory and practice.
The first issue to consider is whether Pogge’s emphasis on the influence of global factors and
institutions means that IC understates the importance of local factors. While Pogge claims that
most economists use ‘explanatory nationalism’ to overstate the significance of local forces for
poverty,25 Allan Patten suggests that Pogge has fallen into the ‘opposite trap’ and engaged in
‘explanatory cosmopolitanism’.26 However, Pogge is on strong ground when he identifies the
ways that the global order bestows international privileges on states and in the ways by which
transnational connections create some supposedly ‘local’ factors. For instance, while local cor-
ruption is often cited as a local factor which causes underdevelopment (and a reason not to
bestow development assistance), Pogge indicates that corruption has been historically supported
by transnational corporations paying the bribes (and receiving tax deductions in Western
countries until 1999).27 While identifying the global derivation of local factors has a significant
level of analytical purchase given the nature of contemporary globalisation, local institutions and
policies are still important to development outcomes. Furthermore, even in an ideal world where
people are aware of their moral responsibilities and pursue them consistently, local practices and
institutions would matter to IC given that this articulation of cosmopolitanism intentionally falls
short of a cosmopolitan democracy or world government.
While there is no doubt that accelerating globalisation has conditioned the nature of local-
domestic factors, local social and political conditions affect development of particular states
in profound ways – for good or ill. The momentous rise of China, India and other South East
Asian economies, and the success of some less developed states, demonstrates that robust
local institutions and economic policies are important to engage with the global economy in a
productive fashion and promote economic development,28 even if such development does not
necessarily encompass democratisation. In particular there is evidence that state-led forms of
initial protectionism have been important to economic successes in Asia.29 On the other side
of the balance-sheet, local factors could hinder the realisation of IC even in the best of circum-
stances where wealthy states embrace their global moral responsibility to assist the global poor.
25 Ibid., 110–12.
26 Alan Patten, ‘Should We Stop Thinking about Poverty in Terms of Helping the Poor?’, Ethics and International
Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 23.
27 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’, 736.
28 United Nations Development Program, 2003 Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), 16.
29 See Ha-Joon Chang, Why Developing Countries Need Tariffs – How WTO NAMA Negotiations Could Deny
Developing Countries’ Right to a Future (Geneva: South Centre and Oxford: Oxfam International, 2005).
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In particular, there may be problematic local political dynamics such as despotism or severe civil
conflict which impede the benefits of a cosmopolitan international order. In these circumstances,
state institutions with robust levels of local legitimacy are a crucial component of a political and
economic context able to alleviate poverty.
The case of civil conflict needs further elaboration. Civil conflict has been a major dynamic
in the poverty of the world’s poorest states.30 Poverty and civil conflict are co-joined in a vicious
circle. These civil conflicts result from the fact that many poor states around the world are
colonial constructs which often have low levels of social cohesion and are wracked by ethnic
cleavages and past civil conflicts. Essentially, many post-colonial states are weak or failing
states. These conflicts were particularly significant in the 1990s with the end of the Cold
War, especially in Africa.31 The 2005 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report
claims that ‘of the 32 countries in the low human development section of the HDI [Human
Development Index] table, 22 have experienced conflict at some point since 1990 and 5 of
these experienced human development reversals over the decade’.32 Some of the evidence is
startling regarding countries recently affected or engaged in civil conflict:
. Nine of the 10 lowest HDI countries have experienced conflict at some point since 1990. Only
two of them were democracies.
. Seven of the 10 countries in the bottom ranking in GDP per capita have undergone conflict in
recent years.
. Five of the 10 countries with the lowest life expectancy suffered conflict in the last 15 years.
. Nine of the 10 countries with the highest infant mortality and child mortality rates have suf-
fered conflict in recent years.
. Eight of the 10 countries with the lowest primary enrolment ratio have experienced conflict at
some point since 1990.
. Nine of the 18 countries whose HDI declined in the 1990s experienced conflict in the same
period. Per capita incomes and life expectancy fell in virtually all of these countries.33
Furthermore, these conditions create significant refugee movements, human rights abuses
and deaths from the actual conflicts. It is the case that these civil conflicts are fuelled by
transnational factors such as the global arms trade (of which a few wealthy states are prime
beneficiaries) and the international privileges that the prevailing order bestows on govern-
ments, as well as the poorly executed processes of decolonisation. But these transnational
factors do not alone cause local patterns of disadvantage and conflict, nor would IC totally
prevent these local forms of conflict. The local structures and political agents of the state
play a key proximate role in specific decisions which lead to conflict and to subsequent patterns
of insecurity and poverty.34 Even though the proposals of IC would place restrictions on
international borrowing privileges of states and therefore could curtail local conflict, local
institutions are still a crucial component to an institutional order which has the potential to
address extreme poverty.
The outcome of these observations is to claim that local factors are important to patterns of
extreme poverty and that stable and legitimate state institutions are important to addressing
poverty and conflict. Therefore the point is not only that IC understates local political dynamics
and institutions, but that the enactment of IC requires a full-blooded articulation of feasible local
30 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank
and Oxford University Press, 2003), chapter 1.
31 Ibid., 93.
32 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report, 154.
33 Ibid., 154.
34 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 172.
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institutional arrangements which connect with the overlaying institutions articulated by the IC
programme. Of course there are moral and political reasons for wealthy states to intervene
and provide assistance to efforts to promote strong and legitimate state functions in the devel-
oping world, as well as, hopefully, regulating the global arms trade. However, it is also important
to relate cosmopolitanism to local institutions, especially in a way that enables local states to
have some self-directed capacity to promote development and poverty alleviation. However,
IC, and cosmopolitan thought more generally, does not engage deeply with the question of
what local institutions and capacities are necessary for poverty alleviation. This is especially
true because in addition to the observation that global institutions cannot readily attend or
address all local dynamics, global institutions may also lack the capacity to deliver benefits.
This is a problem we now address.
The second issue which conditions the approach of IC is the standing of socio-economic
human rights. It is important to consider the political strength and appeal of human rights in
non-ideal settings. In an ideal world, we can expect wealthy states to abide by their moral
responsibilities to the global poor and, barring problems with the global institutional order
itself, or local dynamics as addressed previously, we can reasonably expect extreme global
poverty to be ameliorated over time. However, in non-ideal contexts the political standing of
human rights becomes crucial to the realisation of moral responsibilities required for global
justice. Despite Pogge indicating the importance of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, he bases the moral responsibilities stemming from IC on a moral conception
of human rights rather than legal obligations stemming from existing international human
rights law. Given the dearth of sustained Western government support for enforcing promulgated
socio-economic rights, there are real questions surrounding the contemporary legal and political
position of declared human rights,35 let alone the more profound moral conception upon which
Pogge bases the IC programme.
Clearly the ‘widespread recognition’ of human rights has not been matched by sustained
implementation of socio-economic rights.36 Recent measures to promote international develop-
ment seemingly continue this trend. In particular the relationship between human rights and the
MDGs is questionable. At a basic level of observation, Goal 1 of the MDGs aims to ‘halve,
between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger’,37 while the
UDHR declares that no one should be deprived. In a more detailed study of the MDGs,
Philip Alston claims that Millennium Declaration ‘references to human rights are relatively
fleeting’ and ‘rarely rely on any precise formulations’.38 Indeed, these goals utilise language
which has ‘no fixed normative content, at least when seen from a human rights perspective’.39
Pogge also emphasises that the goals themselves were watered down between the Rome
Declaration on World Food Security in 1996 and the Millennium Declaration in 2000. While
the Rome Declaration sought to halve by 2015 the number of undernourished, the later Millen-
nium Declaration sought to halve by 2015 the percentage of people suffering from hunger
and extreme poverty.40 Of course the fact that internationally agreed human rights are being
35 Although it must be stressed in the post-World War II context, Western efforts to advance socio-economic rights
were stronger. See Daniel J. Whelan and Jack Donnelly, ‘The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the
Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight’, Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (November
2007): 1144–7.
36 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’, 718.
37 United Nations, UN Millennium Project (2006), http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm#goal1
(accessed May 20 2007)
38 Phillip Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen
Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals’, Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 760.
39 Ibid., 760.
40 Pogge, ‘The First UN Millennium Development Goal?’, 378. Pogge indicates that once population growth is
imputed into the percentage of poverty, the poverty reduction target ‘shrunk by 101.5 million’ between these
two declarations.
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marginalised in official forums could mean that there is a greater need for scholars and activists
to argue for human rights, but it does not follow that the political weight of these principles is a
powerful motivation for action and implementation in contemporary global politics. Clearly it
appears that it is the reverse. Unfortunately, the appeal to socio-economic human rights is not a
politically appealing foundation for Pogge’s contention to restructure the global institutional
order.
It must be emphasised that this observation does not mean that human rights have little effect
on global politics. It also does not mean that efforts that have been undertaken to promote socio-
economic rights and the modest signs of progress should be ignored.41 International human
rights law works in a political sense over the long term by developing a normative order that
stipulates certain types of conduct as desirable and other forms of conduct as undesirable.42
As such, international law can be conceived as setting out ‘required’ norms of legitimate
behaviour where some states and NGOs use human rights to shame or leverage recalcitrant
states into internalising human rights norms.43 Of course the problem with human rights inter-
national law is the weak forms of enforcement for most human rights or, even where there are
empowered institutions such as the International Criminal Court, the problem is sparse or
heavily qualified membership and participation by states. But human rights principles have
reshaped the way that many states have conceived of their own priorities over the last five
decades – including contributing to the delegitimation of colonialism.44 So the normative
impact of human rights has been important in establishing a ‘standard of civilisation’ which pro-
motes the value of and respect for individual human beings.45
However, this normative development is of little consolation to the global poor who have
largely been left on the outside of this normative progression. It is clearly the case that economic
and subsistence rights are more weakly supported than other forms of human rights in the con-
temporary context. Western support for the indivisibility of civil-political and socio-economic
rights is currently lacking – even though Western support was more fulsome in the past.46
Contemporary efforts to articulate human rights law have clashed directly with other forms of
international law, such as the international law that enables neo-liberal global capitalism
which has pragmatically promoted property rights and rights of transnational capitalist agents
over human rights.47 The influence of the US also looms large in support of neo-liberalism
and in respect to a suspicious and dismissive stance in relation to socio-economic rights. As
Pogge notes, one of the key problems with the development of economic rights has been the
low level of US support.48 This lack of support in recent decades occurs for a range of ideologi-
cal and pragmatic reasons.49 As long as the preponderance of neo-liberal norms continues there
appears to be firm limits on what we can expect from socio-economic human rights in practice.
The preceding observations combine to place doubts on the viability of IC to be a guide to
political action with respect to global poverty. This doubt stems from an incomplete articulation
of the types of institutions required to promote justice and poverty alleviation because of Pogge’s
41 Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night’, 825–6.
42 See Roslyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), see chapter 1; Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’, in The Politics of International
Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21–4.
43 See Magaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
44 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’, Review of International Studies
27, no. 4 (2001): 519–38.
45 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?’, International Affairs 74 (January 1998): 1–23.
46 See Whelan and Donnelly, ‘The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime’.
47 See Tony Evans, The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), chapter
4.
48 Pogge, ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law’, 720.
49 See Jeffrey Sachs, ‘The Development Challenge’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2005): 78–90.
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9
emphasis on global institutions and responsibilities. There are two principal problems which
stem from the preceding analysis. First, local institutions, especially the state, are more import-
ant to the capacity of IC to address global poverty than Pogge contends. It could be argued that
states only need to enact civil and political human rights, and promote democracy in the dom-
estic domain. However, this counter-argument does not explore the specific types of local insti-
tutions required to promote democracy, let alone the types of institutions which promote
development and poverty alleviation. Second, the preceding points mean that there are strong
reasons to contend that human rights may not generate the moral responsibilities and global
institutions required to support IC and address global patterns of poverty. That is, the failure
of these moral responsibilities is ethically undesirable but unsurprising and foreseeable. As
such, even though Pogge develops the case of the necessity of human rights and the duties
they bestow very strongly as a guide to ethical action in relation to global poverty, the sufficiency
of human rights is questionable. Furthermore, there is a tendency in the discourse of human
rights to emphasise the agency of those who ought to act to fulfil their positive or negative
duties. In the case of global poverty, it could be said that focusing upon the moral responsibility
to promote human rights has the effect of therefore emphasising the political agency of the
wealthy West while downplaying the actual or potential political agency of poor societies and
states. Consequently, it is not just the existence of legitimate local institutions which matters,
but the possibility of developing self-directed local capacities to promote development. A
greater focus on the nature of local institutions is a crucial – and overlooked – accompaniment
to IC’s efforts to redesign global governance.
Augmenting institutional cosmopolitanism
Consequently, the argument here is that greater consideration of local institutions, including the
state, is crucial to proposals that attempt to address global poverty. There are diverse forms of
local institutions, including local community, civil society and kinship structures, yet the infra-
structure of the state remains a crucial framework in political and economic respects to efforts to
address global poverty. In order to promote global justice in a non-ideal world IPT must consider
local capacities and contingencies for situations where poor societies are not assisted actively
and fulsomely supported by wealthy states fulfilling their moral responsibilities. In a sense
this essay contends that efforts to address global poverty need to focus more attention on the
effectiveness of institutions rather than emphasising questions of precise moral responsibility.
As Andrew Kuper argues: ‘It is not enough to say that all persons have equal moral claims
on us; we need to ask how best to organize ourselves politically and economically to meet
those claims. Which combinations of rules and institutions of governance are most effective?’50
However, I argue that it is necessary to move beyond only asking how global cosmopolitan
obligations are going to be met and consider the productive role that local institutions play in
addressing extreme poverty. Focusing on cosmopolitan obligations can narrowly focus political
imagination and action on the agency, intentions and capabilities of the relevant duty bearers,
rather than on the broader conceptions of possible and practical institutional forms which
could potentially improve people’s lives. While some of the proposals of IC could be undertaken
by specific states, more dramatic cosmopolitan transformations of the global order are dependent
upon the willpower of wealthy states.
It must be emphasised that this call to consider the role of the state and local institutions does
not invalidate the approach of IC, or cosmopolitanism more generally. Rather the issue here is a
fundamental question of what should be done, from a perspective which seeks to provide a guide
50 Andrew Kuper, ‘More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”’, Ethics and International
Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002): 112.
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to ethical action in theory and practice in relation to global poverty, if the human rights respon-
sibilities which connect wealthy countries to the poor countries are weakly supported or the
global institutions formulated to address global poverty are weakly developed. In this context
alternative institutional forms become especially important. The contention here is that IC is
incomplete and requires a fuller consideration of suitable local institutions to be a convincing
guide to political practice. While reforming the global context is absolutely crucial to alleviate
global poverty, as Pogge contends, this does not mean that local institutions and agency can be
neglected from a reasonable guide to moral action with respect to global poverty.
One significant counter-argument to the view presented here that we need to consider the role
of local institutions and agency, is to argue for stronger forms of cosmopolitanism. The approach
of cosmopolitan democracy, for example, would attempt to transcend some of the problems indi-
cated here by replacing the moral responsibilities of the rich to the poor with a democratic struc-
ture which would transform notions of moral responsibility into political responsibility such that
global institutions would be accountable for everyone’s welfare. Arguments that seek to promote
global citizenship are evident in political cosmopolitan arguments of thinkers such as David
Held and Richard Falk, who argue that the only way to address problems such as global
poverty is to include everyone in a globally unified democracy underpinned by global citizenship
and cosmopolitan law.51 The development of a cosmopolitan democracy according to these
authors requires the regulation of economic life that goes against the deregulation and privatisa-
tion associated with neo-liberal capitalism, or even the duties embedded in human rights.52 The
proposal of cosmopolitan democracy emphasises the importance of replacing the states-system
with more humane and inclusive institutions which include global forms of representation.
However, even more so than moral cosmopolitanism and the programme of IC, political cosmo-
politans provoke a wider range of criticisms about whether a cosmopolitan democracy is realistic
let alone feasible or desirable – the type of concerns which IC attempts to avoid. Furthermore,
this approach also does not engage with the potential utility of local forms of authority and
community.
Therefore the question turns to what forms of political theory offer resources in thinking
about the potential role of local institutions, especially the state. Clearly social democratic
proposals are one alternative, but contemporary arguments overlap considerably with political
cosmopolitan arguments.53 One largely overlooked approach which focuses upon the state is
neo-roman republicanism. While republicanism has a long and contested legacy, it is a form
of political reasoning which centres on developing civic ethics and institutions which are
intent on establishing liberty as a public achievement within a given state. While republicanism
has been associated with ‘communitarian’ scholars, who have strongly defended the importance
of national political community, neo-republican scholars such as Quentin Skinner and Philip
Pettit have placed republican ideas closer to liberalism by arguing that republicans are intent
on the liberty of the individual but argue, in contrast to liberalism, that this liberty can only
be constituted collectively by a appropriately empowered republican state.54 Consequently,
republicanism’s conception of liberty is an institutionalised context where citizens are free
from subordination or domination by the state itself or by other interests or actors in
society.55 Such a state’s power is managed by checks and balances as well as ongoing citizen
oversight and public deliberation. The aspiration of republican structures and policies is to
51 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
52 Ibid.; David Held, Global Covenant (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Richard Falk, On Humane Governance
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
53 Held, Global Covenant, chapter 10.
54 Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
55 Pettit, Republicanism, 80.
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constitute individual independence by either protecting individuals and dampening down the
flows of power or augmenting the capacity of individuals to protect themselves from subjection.
Specifically, republican thinking can also contribute arguments in support of developing
and designing robust states in parts of the world where states are failing or weak as a result
of endemic civil conflict or tensions.56 The UN has advanced state-building efforts under
the title of ‘peace-building’ as part of its efforts to ‘follow up’ humanitarian interventions
and missions. The goal of peace-building is the ambitious one of ensuring that fragile and
war-torn societies do not lapse back into conflict and abject poverty through the development
of a legitimate state apparatus and the promotion of socio-economic development.57 The
correlation between state weakness/failure and poverty, as mentioned previously in relation
to UNDP data, is a feature of world politics which has important consequences for extreme
global poverty as well as global and local insecurity.58 Rebuilding the political and economic
infrastructure of poor countries is crucial to enabling them to have any hope in engaging
productively with the global economy. One of the problematic aspects of cosmopolitanism
is a lack of sustained connection to the problems of state collapse and rebuilding. State-building
has important analytical, policy and normative implications for avoiding both poverty and
insecurity.
However, there are scholars who argue that Western efforts to promote coherent and stable
states have been unsuccessful and counterproductive.59 Some of the blame for this rests on the
lack of sustained Western willpower and adequate resources. But some of the blame also rests on
the problems with the liberal panacea which underpinned efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to
promote stable states. Efforts to promote stability have been undermined by ‘the destabilising
effects’ that the promotion of liberal conceptions of free market capitalism and rapid democra-
tisation has generated.60 Consequently Michael Barnett has advanced a republican rationale
which could and should underpin peace-building efforts:
Unlike liberal peacebuilding, which uses shock therapy to push postconflict states toward some pre-
determined vision of the promised land, republicanism’s emphasis on deliberative processes allows
space for societal actors to determine for themselves what the good life is and how to achieve it.61
Barnett characterises republicanism as a pragmatic approach to politics which seeks to foster
local political institutions which promote deliberation and representation, which emphasises
the dangers of factions in society and which impose constitutional restraints on authority.62 In
particular such an approach proposes that ‘creating bridges between factions and individuals
as they build a community might also produce a greater love of country and a sense of patriotism,
understood as a sense of belonging that transcends race, ethnicity, or other groupings’.63
The goal in cases of post-conflict reconstruction, and even in cases where the institutions of
state are merely weak or unrepresentative, is to promote the idea of public deliberation as
well as the formation of local political agency which promotes the needs of society. Crucial
here is the sense that the republican promotion of state-building is concerned more with the
56 Michael Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War’, International Security 30, no. 4
(2006): 87–112.
57 Simon Chesterman, ‘State Building and Human Development’, Occasional Paper 1 (2005), p. 1–2.
58 See Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual, ‘Addressing State Failure’, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 153.
59 David Chandler, ‘Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy’, Review of
International Studies 32, no. 3 (2006): 475–94.
60 Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall
1997): 89. See also Chandler, ‘Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy’.
61 Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace’, 90.
62 Ibid., 94.
63 Ibid., 99. For further republican analysis of patriotism and its difference with nationalism see Maurizio Viroli, For
Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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participation and interests of the given societies rather than the visions and interests of the
interveners.
These republican principles also have a resonance wider than just post-conflict rebuilding,
given the number of states around the world suffering from institutional weakness evident in
low levels of popular legitimacy, weak or deficient democratic institutions and socio-economic
underdevelopment. Some economists and observers are cognisant that some neo-liberal pro-
grammes of liberalisation and privatisation authored by the World Bank and IMF have not
worked to promote successful development and have not helped to formulate the legal infra-
structure to underpin vibrant capitalism. This point has also surprisingly been made by Francis
Fukuyama, who says that the ‘excessive zeal in pursuing this “neo-liberal” agenda undermined
the strength of states to carry out those necessary residual government functions’.64 Indeed, in
recent years the IMF and World Bank have actively ‘sought to emphasize their contributions to
the poor’.65 The controversial nature and the real failings of structural adjustment, especially in
Africa,66 meant that this programme was replaced in 1999 by Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) specific to each participating country. These policies have a renewed emphasis
on tailoring programmes in each country to achieve poverty reduction and economic growth
rather than growth alone.67 While these measures demonstrate a shift away from conventional
structural adjustment, they are a modification – not a massive step away from the neo-liberal
agenda.68 However, republicanism would assert that the public of a state should be the ones to
determine, through public deliberation in a democratic political system, what functions the
state should fulfil in order to promote a common sense of liberty – not political theorists or
international bureaucrats.69 Republican political theory has relevance not just to state-building
and post-conflict rebuilding but the more general debate as to what functions states should
fulfil in order to promote development.
Nevertheless, both in the case of post-conflict rebuilding and the more general circumstance
of state weakness, the function of outside international institutions and other countries looms
large. Obviously, countries rebuilding the institutions of a robust state after conflict do not
have all the resources or the military capacity required to ensure this process is successful
and, equally clearly, the Western world has a moral responsibility to support this process.
However, the danger of imperialism, real or perceived, is a significant problem. As Nicholas
Wheeler suggests in his study of humanitarian missions, ‘there is a dangerous arrogance in
the idea that the secure liberal societies of the West have the answers’.70 It must be emphasised
that republicanism is not a ‘one size fits all’ blueprint for state-building. Barnett stresses that not
only does the success of republican proposals depend on a range of factors beyond the control of
any actor involved in post-conflict rebuilding, but the appropriate republican mechanisms to
promote deliberation and political participation cannot be ‘addressed in the abstract, but
rather require judgment informed by a deep knowledge of local circumstances and views’.71
64 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Bring Back the State’, The Guardian, 20 August 2004. See also Francis Fukuyama, State-Build-
ing: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
65 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Global Inequality and International Institutions’, Metaphilosophy 32 (January 2001): 54.
66 Gordon McCord et al., ‘Understanding African Poverty: Beyond the Washington Consensus to the Millennium
Development Goals Approach’, in Africa in the World Economy, ed. Jan Joost Teunissen and Age Akkerman
(The Hague: FONDAD, 2005).
67 International Monetary Fund, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) (2006), http://www.
imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm (accessed 20 December 2007).
68 Jan Aart Scholte, ‘The Sources of Neoliberal Globalization’, UNRISD (November 2002): 17.
69 See Richard Dagger, ‘Neo-republicanism and the Civic Economy’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5, no. 2
(2006): 151–73; Steven Slaughter, Liberty beyond Neo-liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance
in a Globalising Age (Houndmills: Palgrave Press, 2005), chapter 7.
70 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000), 32.
71 Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace’, 111.
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In reference to the World Bank and IMF there is the long-held perception of imperialism and
what Andrew Hurrell refers to as ‘coercive developmental paternalism’ associated with
various forms of conditionality.72 Therefore efforts to improve the effectiveness and responsive-
ness of international institution policies to developing countries are extremely important. The
recent development of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission to act as a central location for exper-
tise regarding state-building and to assist in providing predictable finance could be considered
one modest effort consistent with these imperatives. Likewise, the development of the post-
Washington consensus policies, in respect of the PRSP efforts to enable states to have greater
‘ownership’ of internationally sponsored programmes and the MDGs focus on benchmarks of
each individual country, can be seen to be slightly more responsive to developing states aspira-
tions and sovereignty. These measures could be seen to be a tentative improvement in the effec-
tiveness of efforts by international institutions to develop state capacity and to respect the
sovereignty of developing states.
The republican inspired argument outlined here attempts to promote legitimate local political
capacity and agency via the state. Rather than seeing local institutions and the state as being largely
by-products of global institutional frameworks, the republican argument is that local political
agency and political participation via the state ought to be fostered and encouraged. Such an argu-
ment is a necessary complement to Pogge’s proposal of IC and goes a considerable way to
addresses the lack of attention paid by IC to local political agency and capacity. However,
while the argument here has focused upon the state, other arguments could focus on other types
and elements of local institutions. There are various sorts of local institutions, including civil
society networks, local micro-credit schemes and kinship structures which are important
components to efforts to strengthen local institutions, but which go beyond republican arguments.
Conclusion
This essay’s consideration of IC in relation to global poverty concurs that the moral responsibil-
ity of the continuing tragedy of patterns of extreme poverty rests principally with wealthy gov-
ernments and societies. Furthermore, Pogge’s practical proposals such as the global resource
dividend and a constitutional amendment which qualifies the international borrowing privilege
of states are important proposals which could improve the condition of the global poor.
However, while this essay contends that cosmopolitan moral obligations are valid, this does
not mean that they offer comprehensive political foundations to address global poverty. In
order to be a viable guide to political action which addresses global poverty, consideration
needs to be given to arguments beyond of the ambit of cosmopolitan conceptions of human
rights. The argument here has been that the reliability of global moral responsibilities is ques-
tionable and that local institutions such as the state are important to addressing the problem
of global poverty and are currently overlooked by Pogge’s account of IC. The republican argu-
ments regarding contemporary state-building could be seen to be measures which could produc-
tively parallel and accompany IC. In addition, republican arguments for strengthening the
institutional foundations of states around the world, in terms of enhancing deliberation, citizen-
ship and patriotic principles underpinning the state, are an important theoretical counterpoint to
cosmopolitanism which should be considered alongside cosmopolitan proposals. It must be
emphasised that the objective of promoting robust states in the developing world does not dis-
charge the obligations of wealthy states to create a more just global economic order and should
not be done outside the ambit of established human rights principles.
In essence, while the field of IPT has increased its focus on the forms of governance required to
realise ethical aspirations, the cosmopolitan focus of much of this literature has concentrated on
72 Hurrell, ‘Global Inequality and International Institutions’, 50.
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global governance and has not considered the utility of the state. The issue of global poverty
vividly indicates that local factors and the institutional structures of the state remain important
elements of any reasonable effort to address extreme poverty. The domestic legitimacy of state
institutions and local capacities for collective decision-making about economic affairs are import-
ant and need further consideration within the field of IPT, especially in circumstances where
global programmes are unlikely to be realised because of inaction by dominant states. IPT
needs to consider the ethical and practical implications of state institutions and state-building
more fully. The realisation of global justice requires IPT to couple its consideration of prospective
forms of global governance with the potentially productive role of the state.
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